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Introduction 1 
Performance management systems (PMS) in Asia, and especially South Korea (‘Korea’ from 
now on), can be best understood in the context of the transformation companies have gone 
through in the nature of their relationship with their human resources (HR) and HR 
management (HRM) as a whole within institutional and cultural contexts (Rowley and Paik, 
2009). This evolution can be seen by tracing the development of Korea’s PMS and the reasons 
for shifts and key challenges faced. 
 
The Development of PMS 
PMS developed in within Korea’s Confucian traditions and HRM was characterized as 
paternalistic and collectivistic with a seniority-basis of lifetime employment and tenure-based 
pay (Rowley and Bae, 2001; 2003). Within that tradition employees were paid and promoted 
based on their seniority. 
 
The triggers that made such existing PMS less workable can be classified into two groups. 
First, the internal constraints inherent in seniority-based systems. Basically, such systems 
could be maintained while companies rapidly grew and the average tenure of workforces was 
relatively short. However, if growth and expansion slowed and tenure and seniority increased, 
the burden of labor costs under seniority-based systems rises steeply and inexorably (Kim, 
2005). 
 
Second, external factors gave further momentum to pressures for change. The most 
conspicuous were the following.. First, the 1987 Proclamation of Democratization (Rowley 
and Bae, 2004b) as this removed major restrictions on individual freedoms and rights to 
organize unions, bargain collectively and take collective action were granted. Workers’ 
                                            
1 For further details see authors chapter ‘Performance Management in South Korea’ in A. Varma et al (2009) 
Performance Management Systems: A Global Perspective, Routledge. 
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collective voices, combined with labor market tightness, were big challenges to management. 
In addition, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis highlighted how vulnerable companies were to 
environmental uncertainties as well as threats of heightened global market competition. In 
turn these encouraged firms to change their overarching management views (Rowley and Bae, 
2004b). 
 
As a result of these factors and developments, Korean companies began to shift their 
management orientation towards being more individualistic, contract-based and meritocratic, 
emphasizing greater performance and competencies in HRM. Some managers tried to orient 
employees’ mindsets away from seniority by establishing new performance appraisal (PA) 
systems with performance more central to evaluation criteria and intending to more closely 
link pay to performance. Indeed, some pay-for-performance systems (‘Yunbongje’ or ‘Annual 
Gross Pay Systems’) were adopted, especially by large companies. These trends have been 
regarded as pivotal for changing organisational culture as well as managing HR in a new 
fashion. Accordingly, PMS became an important underpinning element within newly oriented 
HRM systems. Data on the performance of employees obtained from PMS began to replace 
information on personal characteristics (e.g., seniority, educational and social backgrounds) in 
making decisions about important HRM issues such as pay, promotion, training, and so forth. 
 
Part of the new PMS involved feedback to employees about their performance. This began to 
happen. One survey (KRIVET, 2005) found PA results were provided to workers in over one-
third (37%) of companies (with 100 or more employees). However, Korean managers still 
tend to feel uncomfortable articulating what their subordinates have done in their jobs against 
performance criteria in face-to-face meetings. Managers may feel that teamwork and 
relationships with subordinates could be damaged if they articulate their staff’s performance 
and differentiate staff based on their performance. Although managers have to rate their 
subordinates for business purposes, many would prefer not talking with staff about their 
performance directly face-to-face. 
 
In addition, combined with a traditional seniority-based ranking system, a face-saving culture 
encourages people to care about their titles (e.g. on their business cards), which show whether 
they have been promoted in a timely manner in accordance with seniority. Even though senior 
employees may accept the changing reality that they could be outpaced by junior employees 
in terms of pay and promotion, they still want their face to be saved among their family 
members and acquaintances. Indeed, companies try to prevent morale from declining due to 
merit-based PMS and PA systems by letting employees use their traditional titles 
corresponding to their tenure. 
 
Key Challenges Facing PMS 
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Companies face big challenges with cultural fit. In most companies which adopted PMS they 
are used as a key to trying to shift traditional culture towards meritocracy. However, 
challenging and transforming existing culture deeply rooted in ways of thinking and life is 
very difficult since there is very strong inertia as culturally-influenced behaviours remains 
embedded and mutually reinforced in society. One risk for PMS is in being defeated by 
cultural inertia. 
 
Fairness issues have been a major concern in Korea. Combined with prevalent favoritism in 
Korean society, PMS using more subjective PA has been assumed to be highly vulnerable to 
rater arbitrariness or intentional distortions in rating performance. This is one reason why 
companies have tried to find more objective measures for performance. For some people, 
objective performance measures are themselves just or fair, while subjective measures are 
unjust or unfair. However, fairness is not guaranteed with more objective performance 
measures. If construct validity of, and controllability toward, a measured performance is not 
secured, fairness issues would not be ameliorated. 
 
Rating inflation is another major concern. Management worries that raters engaging in lenient 
rating can defeat the desire to more firmly embedded meritocracy in organisations. Raters 
have a strong tendency to give ratings leniently since low ratings can lead to resentment and 
perceptions of inequity while lenient ratings are helpful in maintaining or improving a 
positive climate in the workgroup (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995). This phenomenon is more 
understandable if we take into account that raters’ goals are not necessarily consistent with the 
organisation’s goals. For raters, the ability to maintain positive interpersonal relationships 
with subordinates might be viewed as much more important than turning in ‘accurate’ PA or 
completing the paperwork and filling the boxes in administrative schemes. Some companies 
in Korea have tried to tackle rater leniency problems by forced distribution schemes. Such 
PMS assume employee performances within a rater’s span of control follow a certain kind of 
probability distribution. However, forced distribution PA can bring their own side effects and 
issues (Rowley, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, most Korean companies adopting PMS have not paid sufficient and careful 
attention to raters’ abilities to evaluate accurately and fairly. It has been assumed the abilities 
to appraise performance accurately are somehow ‘inherent’ in managers, which is a common 
myth (Rowley, 2003). Few companies have provided raters with training on how to evaluate. 
According to one survey (of the top 300 companies in Korea) the lack of raters’ abilities to 
evaluate appropriately was a problem to be urgently handled for improving PA systems (SERI, 
2002). 
 
Finally, and linked to the above, is the blithely ignored fact that PMS is not ‘cost-free’ and 
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that they impact on those in professions. Thus, in addition to the corrosive relationship issues 
noted, the transaction and opportunity costs across the whole organization of undertaking 
more verbose and lengthy PMS needs to be considered against any robustly calculable 
‘benefits’. Also, there is the notion of an ethos in many professions which by their nature 
PMS contradict. Without considering these issues, a backlash against PMS may be expected. 
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